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International Courts
YuLIA ANDREEVA, MAURIZIO BRUNETTI, AND GUiLLAUME

LrmENEz*

This report summarizes significant developments in 2011 concerning the International
Court of Justice, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, international tribunals operating
under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and arbitral tribunals constituted under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States.'
I.

International Court of Justice

"The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations." 2 Its jurisdiction is two-fold: to deliver judgments in contentious cases submitted
to it by sovereign states and to issue advisory opinions at the request of certain U.N.
3
organs and agencies.
A.

CONTENTIOUS CASES

During the period under review, the ICJ delivered two judgments and two orders on
the indication of provisional measures, which are summarized below. In addition, one
matter was removed from the Court's list. On April 5, 2011, the ICJ issued an order in
the matter of Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
* Yulia Andreeva, Maurizio Brunetti, and Guillaume Lemenez are Co-Vice Chairs of the ABA Section of
International Law International Courts Committee. Ms. Andreeva serves as Legal Officer at the U.N.
Development Programme, New York. Mr. Brunetti serves as Principal Adviser to the President of the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal, The Hague, Netherlands. Mr. Lemenez serves as Legal Officer in the Legal Practice
Group of the U.N. Office for Project Services, New York. The views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of any government or international organization associated
with them.
1. For a review of events during 2010, see Yulia Andreeva et al., InternationalCourts, 45 INT'L LAW. 125
(2011). For a review of events during 2009, see Carl Magnus Nesser et al., InternationalCourts, 44 INT'L LAW.
129 (2010).
2. The Court, INT'L COURT OFJUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l (last visited Jan. 20,
2012).
3. U.N. Charter arts. 92, 96; Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, available at httpi/
www.iilj.org/courses/documents/StatuteofthelCJArt36and65 .pdf.
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(Belgium v. Switzerland), recording a request by the Kingdom of Belgium to discontinue
4
the proceedings, to which the Swiss Confederation did not object.
1. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua)
On March 8, 2011, the ICJ issued an order on provisional measures requested by Costa
Rica in the matter of Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicaragua) (Order). 5 Costa Rica instituted ICJ proceedings against Nicaragua on
November 18, 2010, claiming an "'[i]ncursion into, occupation of and use by Nicaragua's
Army of Costa Rican territory,' as well as breaches by Nicaragua of its obligations towards
Costa Rica under a number of international legal instruments." 6 On the same day, it filed
a request for the indication of provisional measures, arguing that in the fall of 2010 Nicaragua undertook tree felling and dredging operations in an effort to cut a new channel of
the San Juan River and a canal across the neck of a headland, known as Isla Portillos, near
the Caribbean coastline. 7 The boundary between the two countries follows the right bank
of the San Juan River, and Costa Rica submitted that this new canal was being constructed
in its territory.8 Costa Rica also objected to the continued presence of Nicaraguan troops
on Isla Portillos. 9
The ICJ decided against granting provisional measures in order to prevent Nicaragua
from undertaking dredging operations in the main San Juan River adjacent to the disputed
area. l0 Costa Rica argued that the actions undertaken by Nicaragua in that area did not
only entail a violation of Costa Rica's territorial integrity, but had the effect of causing
flooding and irreparable damage to the Costa Rican territory." Having considered the
evidence put before it, the ICJ concluded that there was insufficient proof that the dredging is "creating a risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica's environment" or that any
such risk of irreparable damage was imminent, which are the two legal criteria for indicating provisional measures. 12
However, the ICJ unanimously ordered the parties to "refrain from sending to, or
maintaining in the disputed territory.., any personnel, whether civilian, police or security" until the boundary dispute is resolved. 13 An exception was made for civilian personnel
from Costa Rica charged with the protection of the environment in the disputed area,1 4 on
the condition that "Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar Conven4. Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Belg. v. Swim), 2011

I.CJ. 145 (Apr. 15).
5. See generally Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
2011 I.CJ. 150 (Mar. 8).
6. Id. 1 1. See also Press Release, International Court ofJustice, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
150/16289.pdf.
7. Costa Rica v.Nicar., supra note 5, 3,31.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See
See
See
See
See

id. 1 65.
id.9191
19, 45.
id. 1 82.
id. 19168-69, 81.
id. 1 82.

13. See id. 91 77, 86.
14. See id. 1 86.
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don 15 in regard to these actions, give Nicaragua prior notice of them and use its best

endeavors to find common solutions with Nicaragua in this respect."1

6

The ICJ con-

cluded by calling on both parties to "refrain from any action which may aggravate or
17
extend the dispute or render it more difficult of [a] solution."
2.

Application of the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination(CERD) (Georgia v. Russian Federation)

On April 1, 2011, the ICJ delivered a judgment on the preliminary objections raised by
the Russian Federation in the case concerning Application of CERD (Georgia v. Russian
s
Federation).' By ten votes to six, the Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to
9
entertain Georgia's application.'
20
As previously reported, Georgia instituted proceedings against Russia on August 12,
2
2008, immediately after the conflict in South Ossetia erupted. ' On August 14, 2008,
Georgia requested provisional measures from the Court to preserve its rights under
CERD and "to protect its citizens against violent discriminatory acts by Russian armed
2 2
On October
forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign mercenaries."
15, 2008, the ICJ rendered an order on Georgia's request, directing both parties to refrain
from targeting ethnic groups in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to abstain from sponsoring, defending, or supporting racial discrimination.23
On December 1, 2009, Russia raised four preliminary objections, arguing that Georgia's application fell outside the jurisdictional limits of Article 22 of CERD, and that the
24
ICJ lacked jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione temporis to consider the matter. With regard to its first objection, Russia contended that there was "no dispute between [the parties] with respect to the interpretation or application of CERD," as Article 22 thereof
requires.2 5 For its part, Georgia maintained that there exists a long-standing dispute over
15. See generally Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245.
16. Costa Rica v. Nicar., mpra note 5, T 86.
17. Id. T 83.
18. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections Judgment, 2011 I.CJ. 140 (Apr. 1), availableat http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/140/16398.pdf.
19. Id. 1 187.
20. See Yulia Andreeva et al., International Courts, 42 INT'L LAW. 345 (2008), available at http:/Hmeetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC930000/otherlinksfiles/
IntemationalCourtsCommittee-2008_Year-in_- Review.pdf.
21. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 2011 I.CJ. 140 (Aug. 12), available at httpJ/
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14657.pdf.
22. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection submitted by the Government of
Georgia, I 1 (Aug. 14. 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/14663.pdf.
23. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v Russ.), Order, 2008 I.CJ. 140, T 149 (Oct. 15), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
140/14801.pdf.
24. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 21, T 22.
25. See id. T 23.
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26
unlawful acts of racial discrimination between the parties, going back at least a decade.
In the judgment, the ICJ rejected Russia's objection, noting that while the claims Georgia
raised in its application against Russia between August 9 and 12, 2008, primarily concerned the unlawful use of force, they also expressly referred to ethnic cleansing by Russian military forces.27 Since these claims were made against Russia directly and were
rejected by the latter, the ICJ found that by August 12, 2008, there was a dispute between
the parties about Russia's compliance with its obligations under CERD.28 At the same
time, the ICJ also found that Georgia failed to supply sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that a dispute between the parties on matters falling under CERD predates the beginning
29
of armed hostilities in South Ossetia.
The ICJ then turned to consider Russia's second and third preliminary objections,
namely that Georgia was precluded from having recourse to the ICJ as it had failed to
satisfy the two procedural preconditions contained in Article 22 of CERD, which requires
the parties to attempt to settle a dispute between them "by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for" in CERD before resorting to ICJ proceedings. 30 For its
part, Georgia maintained that Article 22 does not establish any express obligation to negotiate, nor does it establish any obligation to have recourse to the procedures provided for

in CERD before referring the dispute to the Court.

31

Looking at the ordinary meaning of the terms used in Article 22 of CERD, the Court
32
observed that the expression "'a dispute' ... 'which is not settled"' must be given effect.
"[T]he express choice of two modes of dispute settlement, namely, negotiations or resort
to the special procedures under CERD," suggested an affirmative duty to resort to them
33
prior to instituting the ICJ proceeding.
Having reviewed its jurisprudence concerning compromissory clauses comparable to
Article 22 of CERD, the Court further noted that it has consistently interpreted the reference to negotiations in such clauses as constituting a precondition to jurisdiction. 34 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the relevant terms of Article 22 of CERD establish
preconditions to be fulfilled before jurisdiction can be had. According to the Court, the
facts in the record showed that although between August 9 and 12, 2008, the parties did
engage in some discussions, the latter did not pertain specifically to CERD-related matters. 35 Hence, the Court concluded that the parties did not engage in negotiations with
respect to Russia's compliance with its substantive obligations under CERD.36 Noting
that Georgia did not claim to have used the other mode of dispute resolution contained at
Article 22, namely the procedures expressly provided for in CERD, the Court found that
37
it did not need to examine whether the two preconditions are cumulative or alternative.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id. 24.
Id.
113-14.
See id.
See id. 167.
Id. I 117.
See id. 118.
Id. T 133.

33. See id. J

34.
35.
36.
37.

133-34.

See id. 9] 136-40.
See id. 171-80.
See id. 9] 182.
See id. 183.
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Having upheld Russia's second preliminary objection, the Court found that "it is required neither to consider nor to rule on the other objections to its jurisdiction raised by
[Russia] and that the case cannot proceed to the merits phase." 38 Finally, noting that its
2008 order regarding the provisional measures had ceased to be operative upon delivery of
the Judgment, the Court reminded the parties that they were under a duty to comply with
39
their obligations under CERD.
3. Request for Interpretationof the Judgment of June 15, 1962, in the Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
On July 18, 2011, the ICJ issued an order upholding Cambodia's request for the indication of provisional measures in its long-standing dispute with neighboring Thailand over
their land boundary around the Temple of Preah Vihear (Order). Cambodia instituted
ICJ proceedings against Thailand on April 28, 2011, requesting the Court to interpret a
previous judgment issued in June 1962. In that judgment, the Court found that "the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia." ° Cambodia also filed a request for the indication of provisional measures to "cause [the]
incursions onto its territory [by Thailand] to cease" pending the Court's ruling on the
request for interpretation of the 1962 judgment. 41 While Thailand did not challenge
Cambodia's sovereignty over the Temple, it argued that it did not extend to the surrounding area, to which Thailand claims sovereignty.42 The parties' dispute over the contested
area has led to armed clashes between them and has triggered the involvement of regional
organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as
43
the United Nations.
In its Order, the ICJ first concluded that "a difference of opinion or views" existed
between the parties over the meaning and scope of the 1962 judgment. 44 The existence of
a dispute satisfied the requirement of Article 60 of the ICJ Statute 45 and provided the ICJ
with jurisdiction to entertain Cambodia's application under Article 41 of the statute.
Based on this conclusion, the ICJ rejected Thailand's application to remove the case from
the list on the ground that there was no dispute. 46 Turning to the merits of Cambodia's
request, the Court emphasized that the indication of provisional measures is limited to
situations of urgency, i.e., where "a real and imminent risk [exists] that irreparable
38. Id. 9 185.
39. See id. 186.
40. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 36 (une 15), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/45/4871 .pdf.
41. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of June 15, 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thai.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 9 3 (Apr. 28, 2011), availableat http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/1 51/16472.pdf.
42. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of June 15, 1962, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thai.), Order, 2011 I.CJ. 151, 91 29-30 (July 18), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/
16564.pdf.
43. See id. 9 53.
44. See id. 9 31-32.
45. Statute of the I.CJ., art. 60, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=
2&p3=0#CHAPTER.IH ("In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court
shall construe it upon the request of any party.").
46. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of June 15, 1962, supra note 42, 99 32, 69.
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prejudice may be caused to the rights in dispute." 47 To this end, the Court noted the
violent clashes between the parties, and it observed that such clashes could reoccur, despite a recently agreed ceasefire, and that such confrontations may cause irreparable dam4
age to the Temple itself. 8
Without prejudice to its pending decision on interpretation, the ICJ defined a provisional demilitarized area around the temple site that will be off-limits for any military
personnel from both neighboring states. Further, it ordered that all military forces leave
that area and refrain from any military activity directed within the zone. 49 Acknowledging
that Cambodia's sovereignty over the Temple is not disputed, the ICJ further ordered
Thailand not to obstruct Cambodia's free access to the Temple, and in particular, Cambodia's provision of fresh supplies to its non-military personnel in the Temple.50 The ICJ
also indicated that observers from ASEAN must be allowed to access the provisional
5
zone. 1
4. Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia v. Greece)
On December 5, 2011, the ICJ delivered a judgment in the case concerning Application
of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v.
Greece) (udgment).
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) instituted proceedings against
Greece on November 17, 2008, claiming that the latter breached the Interim Accord
signed by the two States in 1995 by blocking FYROM's access to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2008.52

Article 11 of the Interim Accord records Greece's commitment not to object to the
application by, or the membership of FYROM in international, multilateral, and regional
organizations and institutions of which Greece is a member. It further provides, however,
that Greece may object to any such membership if and to the extent FYROM is to be
referred to in such institution differently than in Security Council Resolution 817 (1993),
i.e. "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."5 3 Relying on that provision, FYROM
submitted that at a meeting of NATO member States in Bucharest in April 2008, Greece
had manifested its objection to FYROM's admission to membership, citing the fact that
the difference regarding FYROM's name remained unresolved. FYROM was subsequently invited to begin talks on accession to the organization "as soon as a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached."5 4 In its application, FYROM
asked the ICJ to find Greece in breach of Article 11 of the Interim Accord and to order it
55
to take steps to ensure compliance with its obligations.
47. Id. 47.
48. See id. 61.

49. See id. 11 62-63, 69.
50. See id. 69.
51. See id.
52. See Application of Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (former Yugoslav Republic of Maced. v.
Greece), T 1 (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf.
53. See id. 21.
54. See id.
22, 77, 79.
55. See id. T 12.
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Greece objected to the ICJ's competence to consider the dispute, arguing that the latter
concerns the differences over FYROM's name and the conduct attributable to NATO and
its member States. It also claimed that the Court's judgment would be incapable of effective application because it could not affect FYROM's admission to NATO. Finally, it
reasoned that the exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with the diplomatic negotiations
between the States concerning the difference over FYROM's name. 56 The ICJ rejected
Greece's objections, 57 finding, inter alia, that Greece's conduct, irrespective of NATO's
58
final decision on FYROM's membership, lies at the heart of FYROM's application.
Furthermore, FYROM was not seeking to reverse NATO's decision, but to determine
whether Greece violated its obligations under the Interim Accord as a result of its
conduct.

59

With regard to the merits of the dispute, the Court found that by objecting to
FYROM's membership application to NATO, Greece violated Article 11 of the Interim
Accord. 60 The exception in the second clause of Article 11 did not apply, since FYROM's
intention to refer to itself in an international organization by its constitutional name did
6
not mean that it was "to be referred to" in such organization "differently than" FYROM. 1
The ICJ also rejected Greece's alternative arguments, including that the objection was
prompted by FYROM's material breach of the Interim Accord. 62 The Court concluded
that a finding of breach constituted appropriate satisfaction and ordered no further
63
remedy.
B.

GENERAL LIST

As of December 5, 2011, the list of pending contentious proceedings before the ICJ
included the following thirteen cases, listed by date of introduction: Gabcakovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia);Abmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic
of the Congo); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v.
Uganda); Application of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia); Territorialand Maritime Dispute (Nicaraguav. Colombia); Maritime
Dispute (Peru v. Chile); Aerial HerbicideSpraying (Ecuadorv. Colombia);JurisdictionalImmunities of the State (Germany v. Italy); QuestionsRelating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal); Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan); Frontier Dispute
(Burkina Faso/Niger);CertainActivities carriedout by Nicaraguain the BorderArea (Costa Rica
v. Nicaragua);Request for interpretationof the Judgment ofJune 15, 1962, in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vibear (Cambodia v. Tbailand). In addition, the Court is considering
56. See id. 26.
57. See id. 28-61.
58. See id. 43.
59. See id. 9150.
60. See id.IT9 67-83; see also id.1 81 ("[D]emonstrat[ing] that through formal diplomatic correspondence
and through statements of its senior officials, the Respondent made clear before, during and after the
Bucharest Summit that the resolution of the difference over the name was the 'decisive criterion' for the
Respondent to accept the Applicant's admission to NATO.").
61. See id.1$ 84-103.
62. See id.9191
127-65.
63. See id.11 167-69.
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a request for an advisory opinion in the matter ofJudgment No. 2867 of the Administrative
Tribunalof the InternationalLabor Organization.
C.

COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

As of December 31, 2011, the Court was composed of the following judges: Hisashi
Owada (Japan), President; Peter Tomka (Slovakia), Vice-President; Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone); Awn Shawkat AI-Khasawneh (Jordan); Bruno Simma (Germany); Ronny
Abraham (France); Kenneth Keith (New Zealand); Bernardo Septilveda-Amor (Mexico);
Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco); Leonid Skomikov (Russian Federation); Ant6nio A.
Canqado Trindade (Brazil); Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf (Somalia); Christopher Greenwood
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Xue Hanqin (China); and Joan
E. Donoghue (United States of America).
H1.

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal

The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) was established in 1981 through the
Algiers Declarations64 as one of the measures intended to defuse an acute political crisis
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America; the crisis had
arisen out of the detention of fifty-two U.S. nationals at the United States Embassy in
Tehran between 1979 and 1981 and the subsequent economic sanctions that the United
States imposed on Iran. 65 The Tribunal hears two categories of claims: (1) private claims,
which are claims brought by a national of one country against the other country; and (2)
inter-governmental claims, which are claims brought by one country against the other,
alleging either a violation of the Algiers Declarations or breach of contract. 66 After thirty
years in operation, the Tribunal has decided all of the private claims. Thus far, the Tribunal has disposed of nearly 4,000 cases and awarded more than US$2.5 billion to the
United States and U.S. nationals and approximately US$1 billion to Iran and Iranian nationals. 67 The remaining task for the Tribunal is to adjudicate several large, complex, and
sensitive claims between the two governments.
One of the main focuses of the Tribunal's activity during the period in review was on
post-award issues in a large government-to-government case-Iranv. United States, Cases
Nos. A3, A8, A9, and B61 (Case No. B61). The Tribunal rendered a Partial Award in
Case No. B61 on July 17, 2009 (Partial Award). 68 The claimant, Iran, and the respondent,
64. The term "Algiers Declarations" refers to the Declaration of the Gov't of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1981) [hereinafter General Declaration], and the Declaration
of the Gov't of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Gov't of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 9 (1981) [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration].
65. About the Tribunal,IRAN-U.S. CLAims TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.org/english/pagel/about.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2011).
66. Id.
67. Communiqui, IRAN-U.S. Ct.Aims TRIBsUNAL (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.iusct.org/communiqueenglish.pdf.
68. See generally Iran v. United States, 38 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 197 (2009) [hereinafter Partial Award].
The Partial Award has been previously discussed in Carl Magnus Nesser, et al., InternationalCourts, 44 INr'L
LAW. 129, 138-39 (2010).
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the United States, subsequently submitted requests asking that the Tribunal to take postaward action.
A.

REQUEST FOR REVISION

Iran submitted a request for the revision of a section of the Partial Award (Request),
invoking an alleged 'inherent power' of the Tribunal to reopen and reconsider a final and
binding award on the merits under exceptional circumstances. As a basis for its Request,
Iran alleged a number of 'fundamental errors of procedure' and 'manifest errors of law,'
which, in Iran's view, the Tribunal majority had committed in rendering the Partial
Award. According to Iran, those alleged errors constituted exceptional circumstances warranting the revision of the Partial Award. Among other things, Iran asserted that, by
basing its decision on a legal argument that was never raised by the parties, the majority
violated Iran's due process rights.
Neither the Claims Settlement Declaration nor the Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Tribunal Rules) 69 provide for the reopening and reconsideration of a case on the merits after
an award has been rendered.
On July 1, 2011, the Tribunal issued a decision ruling on Iran's Request. 70 It unanimously concluded that it was "not prepared to hold that it ha[d] an inherent power to
revise a final and binding award" under the circumstances. 7 1 In reaching this conclusion,
the Tribunal considered its own particular features, including the circumstances surrounding its establishment as well as the object and purpose of the Algiers Declarations; 72 it also
took into account (i) that the remedy of revision had not been introduced into the Tribunal Rules when the Tribunal, in consultation with the two State Parties, modified the
UNCITRAL Rules in 1983, and (ii) that a mechanism is available under the Claims Settlement Declaration and the Tribunal Rules to modify the Rules if the Tribunal or the two
73
State Parties ever deem it necessary to provide the remedy of revision.
Additionally, the Tribunal noted the suggestion in the literature that, because a decision
proven to have been induced by fraud or perjury does not constitute a "decision in law,...
the right and indeed the duty to render a valid judgment or award must be seen to continue;" and that the "argument that, in such circumstances, the reopening of the case can
hardly be described as revision in the normal understanding of the notion is clearly a
69. TribunalRules of Procedure,IRAN-U.S. CLAMS TRiBUTNAL, http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2011).
70. Iran v. United States, Decision No. DEC 134-A3/A8/A9/A14/B61-FT (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 2011),
http://www.iusct.org/Recently%20Filed/B61%2ODoc%20961%20EN%20(DEC).pdf
[hereinafter Iran
Decision].
71. See id. T 64.
72. See id.
61-63.
73. Id. 1 64. Article m (2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration directs that "the Tribunal shall conduct its
business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that this Agreement can be carried out." Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 64, at 10. Article 1(1) of the Tribunal
Rules provides that, "[w]ithin the framework of the Algiers Declarations, the initiation and conduct of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be subject to the following Tribunal Rules which may be modified
by the Full Tribunal or the two Governments." Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note 69, at 3.
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strong one." 74 But because neither fraud nor perjury had been alleged in Case No. B61,
the Tribunal did not need to address the matter.
The Tribunal's Decision is the first published arbitral decision in a long time that takes
a firm position on an arbitral tribunal's inherent power to revise a final and binding award
on the merits. It is important to note that the Decision does not exclude the possibility
that other arbitral tribunals, operating under different circumstances, might possess such a
power. Because the Decision thoroughly reviews the practice of international courts and
tribunals with respect to the existence of a power of revision in the absence of any textual
basis, considers the most recent legal writings on the matter, and spells out in detail the
grounds for the Tribunal's conclusion, it is of general interest well beyond the confines of
the Tribunal.

B.

REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL

AwARD

The United States, for its part, presented a request, pursuant to Article 37 of the Tribunal Rules, 75 that the Tribunal issue an additional award dismissing a certain claim from
Case No. B61. In the U.S. view, that claim had been presented by Iran in the proceedings
in Case No. B61 but not resolved in the Partial Award.
By unanimous decision ofJuly 1, 2011, the Tribunal rejected the U.S. Request for Additional Award. 76 The Tribunal noted that the Partial Award had expressly deferred the
Tribunal's decision pending further briefing by the parties. 77 The Tribunal concluded
that the subject matter of the U.S. Request for Additional Award was not omitted from the
Partial Award but was discussed in paragraphs 176 through 179 and also referred to in the
78
dispositif.

I.

Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an inter-governmental organization created by the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague
Convention). 79 Its mandate is to facilitate arbitration and other means of peaceful dispute
resolution between States, State-controlled entities, intergovernmental organizations, and
private parties. Its seat is the Peace Palace in The Hague. Albania is the 113th and most
80
recent State to accede to one of the PCA's founding conventions.
The International Bureau of the PCA provides full registry and administrative services
to tribunals constituted under its own rules of procedure, the UNCITRAL Arbitration
74. Iran Decision, supra note 70, at 64, n.105 (citing authorities).
75. Article 37(1) of the Tribunal Rules provides that, "[w]ithin thirty days after the receipt of the award,
either party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award as to
claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award." TribunalRules,snpra note 69, at 34.
76. Iran v. United States, Decision No. DEC 135-A3/A/A9/A14/B61-FT (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 2011),
[hereinafter U.S.
http://www.iusct.org/Recently%20Filed/B61%20Doc%20962%20EN%20(DEC).pdf
Decisionl.
77. See PartialAward, 38 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 265.
78. U.S. Decision, supra note 76, at 22.
79. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779.
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBrFRATION, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pap-id=
80. Member States,
1038 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
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Rules, and other ad hoc rules. In addition, the PCA Secretary-General is regularly called
upon to designate an 'appointing authority' to appoint arbitrators under the UNCITRAL
Rules; he is also asked to act directly as appointing authority in numerous treaties and
contracts. In March 2011, the PCA received the inaugural award for "Arbitral Institution
of the Year" from Global Arbitration Review.
In 2011, eighteen new cases were added to the PCA's docket. The PCA presently
serves as registry in fifty-seven pending cases: three inter-State arbitrations, thirty-four
investor-State arbitrations under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties or national
investment laws, and twenty arbitrations under contracts in which one party is a State,
State entity, or inter-governmental organization. The PCA Secretary-General was called
upon to designate an appointing authority or directly appoint an arbitrator or an expert,
or to decide a challenge to an arbitrator in twenty-four new cases, bringing the total to
186 such cases in the last five years. Eleven awards were rendered in PCA-administered
arbitrations in 2011.
A.

INDUS WATERS KISHENGANGA ARBITRATION

Among the awards and decisions rendered this year for which public disclosure was
authorized, of particular interest is the Order on Interim Measures rendered by the Court
of Arbitration in the Indus Waters KisbengangaArbitration (Pakistanv. India) (Interim Measures Order).Sl The decision marks the first time that a State-State tribunal ordered one
s2
State to cease work on part of a construction project pendente lite.
Pakistan initiated arbitration in May 2010 pursuant to the dispute resolution mechanism set forth in the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 (Treaty). The Treaty allocates the use of
the Indus river system between the two countries. Uniquely, instead of sharing, the
Treaty grants each State the exclusive use of specific rivers in the Indus basin, with limited
exceptions for domestic, non-consumptive, and agricultural use, as well as for the generation of hydroelectric power.
This is the first instance in the Treaty's fifty-year history that a Court of Arbitration has
been constituted. The Court is composed by Judge Stephen Schwebel (Chairman), Sir
Franklin Berman, Professor Howard Wheater, Professor Lucius Caflisch, Professor Jan
Paulsson, Judge Bruno Simma, and Judge Peter Tomka. At seven members, it is the largest ever PCA-administered tribunal.
The dispute arose in relation to a hydroelectric project (Project) being built on the
Indian side of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir into areas administered respectively
by India and Pakistan.8 3 The Project involves India's building of a dam on the Kishenganga/Neelum River and diverting part of its waters into another tributary of the Jheelum
River via a thirty-odd-kilometer tunnel; such water would then cross the Line of Control
81. Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Order on the Interim Measures Application of
Pakistan (Permanent Ct. of Arb. 2011), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/16.%200rder% 20on% 2OInterim% 20Measures% 2Odated% 202 3% 20September% 20201 l.pdf [hereinafter Interim Measures Order].
82. Requests for provisional measures were rejected by the ICJ in, inter alia,
Passage Through the Great
Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures, 1991 I.CJ. 12 (July 29) and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg.
v. Uru.), Provisional Measures, 2006 I.CJ. 113 (July 13).
83. See Shimla Agreement on Bilateral Relations, India-Pak., July 2,1972, 11 I.L.M. 954.
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at another point. The Parties disagree on the application of portions of the Treaty in
relation to the hydroelectric project. As of the time of writing, the Parties' substantive
pleadings are confidential.
In June 2011, the Court of Arbitration, accompanied by members of the Registry and
representatives of both Parties, conducted a weeklong site visit of the Neelum-Jhelum and
Kishenganga hydroelectric projects and surrounding areas (including by helicopter and
land across the Line of Control). Site visits conducted by State-State international tribunals are very rare; prior to this, the last case in which a PCA tribunal conducted such a
visit was the GrisbadarnaArbitration (Norway/Sweden, 1909). Site visits at the Interna84
tional Court of Justice are similarly rare.
One week before the site visit, on June 6, 2011, Pakistan applied for interim measures
requesting the cessation of all work on the Project. After hearings held in late August, the
Court issued its Order on Interim Measures on September 23, 2011, ruling that it "is open
to India to continue with all works relating to the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Project,
except for ...the construction of any permanent works on or above the Kishenganga/
Neelum riverbed ...that may inhibit the restoration of the full flow of that river to its
85
natural channel."
Paragraph 28 of Annexure G of the Treaty allows the arbitral tribunal to lay down such
interim measures as are "necessary to safeguard its interests under the Treaty with respect
to the matter in dispute, or to avoid prejudice to the final solution or aggravation or
extension of the dispute."8 6 Relying on the interpretation provision of the Treaty, which
permits recourse both to "[i]nternational conventions establishing rules which are expressly recognized by the Parties [and] customary international law," India submitted that
the Treaty's spare terms as regards interim measures should be complemented by the requirements developed by the ICJ in its case law on provisional measures: plausibility of the
alleged rights the protection of which is being sought; a risk of irreparable prejudice; and
87
urgency.
The Court was not persuaded that the ICJ's provisional measures jurisprudence is entirely apposite here. Although claims of any party seeking interim measures should appear
at least "plausible," the Court saw no need to engraft the ICJ's requirements of "urgency"
and "irreparable injury" upon the Treaty, given the difference in respective wording of
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Paragraph 28 of Annexure G. The Court found that
Paragraph 28 is lex specialis, as it sets out three distinct grounds on which interim measures
can be found to be "necessary," one of which is "to avoid prejudice to the final solution...
of the dispute."88 This ground enables (and indeed seems to require) the Court "to safeguard [its] own freedom to prescribe in due course what it considers to be the correct
outcome on the substance of a given dispute."8 9 The Court ordered India to halt any
84. The only comparable site visit conducted by the ICJ occurred in the 1990s in relation to the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. Press Release, Int'l Court Justice, Case Concerning the Gabckovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia): Second Round of Hearings (Apr. 9, 1997), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.phppr=264&pl=3&p2=1 &case-92&p3=6&PHPSESSID=.
85. Interim Measures Order, supra note 81, at 152.
86. Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., Annexure G 9 28, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126, 220.
87. Interim Measures Order, supra note 81, at
79-81.
88. Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 86, at 220.
89. Interim Measures Order, supra note 81, at 1 134.
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construction of permanent structures on or above the Kishenganga/Neelum riverbed because such works could present a "risk of constricting the legal principles to which the
Court may have recourse in its Award" and of "foreclosing, delaying the implementation
of, or rendering disproportionately large the cost of particular remedies that the Court
may choose to order." 90 Conversely, other components of the Project, such as the boring
of tunnels and building of sub-surface foundations of the dam, could proceed, as the
river's flow would remain unrestricted even if construction of such aspects is completed.91
IV.

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in 1966.92 With the signature of Cape Verde, effective January 26, 2011, a total of
157 States were signatories to the Convention. 93 This section reports on decisions delivered by ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees in 2011.94
A.

AwARDs

During the period under review, ICSID tribunals rendered thirteen awards.
In Lemire v. Ukraine, the Claimant initiated proceedings against Ukraine in relation to a
radio broadcasting enterprise. On March 28, 2011, a tribunal awarded compensatory
damages to the Claimant on the ground that Ukraine's practice regarding the allocation of
radio frequencies violated the fair and equitable treatment standard under the 1996 Treaty
between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment. However, it rejected the Claimant's request for
moral damages on the ground that the facts of the case did not constitute exceptional
circumstances warranting the award of such damages. On July 27, 2011, Ukraine filed an
application for annulment with the Centre.
In Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, the Claimant brought claims against Peru in connection with its investment in a company purchasing and exporting fishmeal. On July 7,
2011, a tribunal found that Peru's imposition of interim measures on the Claimant constituted an indirect expropriation and awarded compensatory damages to the Claimant. On
November 9, 2011, the Centre registered Peru's annulment application.
In Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, .the Claimant initiated arbitration against Argentina in relation to its investment in a water and sewage disposal facility. On June 21,
2011, a tribunal found that Argentina failed to treat the Claimant's investment in a fair
and equitable manner and awarded compensatory damages to the Claimant. On October
25, 2011, the Centre registered Argentina's annulment application.
90. Id. 1 148.
91. See id. 142.
92. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
art. 1, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
93. See List of ContractingStates and Other Signatories of the Convention, INT'L CTR. FOR SET-rrLEMEW OF
INv. DispsTrEs (May 5, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServletrequestType=ICSIDDocRH
&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English.
94. Unless otherwise indicated, all awards and decisions referred to in this section can be found at http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp or at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/.
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In Malicorp Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, the Claimant initiated proceedings against
Egypt in relation to the termination of a concession for the construction and operation of
an airport. According to the Claimant, Egypt had breached the provisions relating to the
promotion and protection of foreign investments and expropriation found in the 1975
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments. On February 7, 2011, a tribunal rejected the Claimant's claim on the ground
that the termination of the concession was justified in light of the false representations
made by the Claimant to Egypt and did not constitute an expropriation.
In Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador, the
Claimants presented a claim against El Salvador based on the non-renewal of their mining
exploration licenses. On March 14, 2011, a tribunal dismissed the claim on the ground
that the Claimants had not complied with the waiver provision of the Central AmericanDominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, according to which the Claimant had to
waive its rights to pursue domestic proceedings before initiating arbitration. On July 15,
2011, the Centre registered the Claimants' annulment application.
In El Paso Energy InternationalCompany v. Argentine Republic, the Claimant initiated proceedings against Argentina after it adopted a series of measures that affected the Claimant's investment in Argentina's hydrocarbon and electricity industries. According to the
Claimant, the Government's measures were illegal, arbitrary, and discriminatory;
breached Argentina's obligation to grant foreign investors fair and equitable treatment,
full protection and security, and a treatment not less favorable than that required by international law; and constituted an expropriation without prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation. A final award was rendered on October 31, 2011.
In Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, the Claimant brought a claim
against Turkey in relation to the alleged expropriation of its investment in two electricity
companies. On September 2, 2011, a tribunal dismissed the claim on the ground that the
Claimant had not proven that it owned shares in the electricity companies at the time of
the alleged expropriation. The tribunal ordered the Claimant to reimburse Turkey's legal
fees and expenses.
In RSM Production Corporation v. Central African Republic, the Claimant initiated proceedings against the Central African Republic in relation to the non-renewal of a petroleum exploration and exploitation contract. According to the Claimant, the contract
should have been suspended and its term should have been extended due to force majeure
events that had prevented its normal execution. On December 7, 2010, a tribunal rendered a first decision on jurisdiction and liability against the Central African Republic,
reserving the issue of damages for a subsequent decision. The final award addressing the
issues of compensatory and moral damages was rendered on July 11, 2011. It was not
publicly available at the time of this writing. An annulment application by the Central
African Republic was registered by ICSID on November 21, 2011.
In M. Meerapfel Sbhne AG v. Central African Republic, the Claimant brought an action
against the Central African Republic in relation to its investment in a tobacco company.
The final award rendered on May 12, 2011 was not publicly available at the time of this
writing.
In Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Claimant
brought a claim against Venezuela in relation to the alleged expropriation of its investment in Venezuela's largest telecommunication company. On August 2, 2011, a tribunal
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dismissed the proceeding on the ground that Venezuelan investment law did not provide
the State consent to ICSID.
In GEA Group Aktiengesellscbaft v. Ukraine, the Claimant initiated proceedings against
Ukraine in relation to its investment in a petrochemical company. According to the
Claimant, Ukraine had violated its obligations under the provisions of the 1993 Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, relating to expropriation, full protection and security, fair
and equitable treatment, arbitrary and discriminatory measures, national treatment, mostfavored nation treatment, and adherence to obligations. On March 31, 2011, a tribunal
rejected the Claimant's claims and ordered the Claimant to reimburse Ukraine's arbitration costs.
In VattenfallAB, VattenfallEurope AG, Vattenfall Europe GenerationAG v. FederalRepublic
of Germany, the Claimant brought a claim against Germany in relation to the construction
of a coal-fired power plant. According to the Claimants, the failure of Germany to grant
the Claimant certain administrative permits required for the construction of the plant
constituted a breach of the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty relating to fair and
equitable treatment, most constant protection and security, and expropriation. On March
11, 2011, the tribunal recorded the parties' settlement agreement.
In EVN AG v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Claimant initiated an action
against the former Republic of Macedonia under the Energy Charter Treaty in relation to
the Claimant's investment in an electricity distribution company. On September 2, 2011,
a tribunal recorded the parties' settlement agreement.
B.

ANNuLMENT DECISIONS

ICSID ad hoc committees delivered three annulment decisions in 2011.
In Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, the Claimant requested partial
annulment of an award of September 4, 2008, in which a tribunal rejected all but one of
the Claimant's claims. The Claimant alleged that the tribunal had failed to apply the
governing law by holding that the applicability of Article XI of the relevant bilateral investment treaty meant that Argentina was not required to compensate Continental for
measures taken during the period of Argentina's economic difficulties, even after those
difficulties were over. Argentina, for its part, requested the annulment of that part of the
award that was adverse to it. In a decision of September 16, 2011, an ad hoc committee
dismissed both annulment applications.
In Duke Energy InternationalPeru Investments No. I Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, Peru requested the annulment of a jurisdictional decision rendered on February 1, 2006, in favor
of the Claimant, and, in the alternative, the partial annulment of the final award rendered
on August 18, 2008. In its request, Peru asserted that the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers, seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, and failed to
state the reasons on which the award was based. In a decision of March 1, 2011, an ad hoc
committee dismissed Peru's annulment application and ordered Peru to reimburse the
costs the Claimant had incurred in connection with the annulment proceeding.
In Togo Electriciti and GDF-Suez Energie Services v. Republic of Togo, Togo applied for
annulment of an award rendered on August 10, 2011, alleging that the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers, failed to state the reasons on which the award was based, and
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seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure. In a decision of September 6,
2011, an ad hoc committee dismissed Togo's annulment application and ordered Togo to
reimburse the costs incurred by the Claimants in connection with the annulment
proceeding.
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